Abstract-A symmetric group key agreement protocol enables the group members to derive a shared session key for secure communication among them, while an asymmetric one facilitates security to any communication from outside, without adding outsiders into the group. In this paper, we propose a twofold group key agreement protocol which addresses the need of a shared symmetric key among insider members in a group and an asymmetric key pair for any unrestricted sender. In particular, we look forward for a solution to provide secure communication among multiple processing clusters (PCs) actively running on an integrated circuit (IC). The proposed protocol offers a lightweight symmetric encryption for intra zone communication and a public key encryption for inter zone communication taking most advanced security issues into account.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC) architecture, in order to achieve the performance goal, the application is divided into tasks and we spread them on the IP cores (in this paper, we use the terms 'IP core', 'PC' and 'User' interchangeably). For a sensitive application, secure zones can be implemented through the firewall on the boundary PCs of the zone [1, 2] . This approach can only protect continuous security zones, where all the PCs are physically close. Unfortunately, the probability that tasks are allocated to continuous security zone, is very low. The security zones which are scattered on the MPSoC platform, are known as disrupted security zones. The IPs involved in these zones are forced to communicate and indeed, a session key is needed to encrypt the communication.
To derive the session key among these IP cores, the initial solutions attempt to achieve pair-wise communication security. However, they do not support group-wise confidential communication. In 2014, Sepulveda et al. [2] presented elastic security zones for 3D-MPSoC with group-wise shared secret establishment protocols. Later, another feasible solution was suggested in [1] which employs the use of hybrid group key agreement protocol. The work in [1] implemented two different approaches. The first approach is based on key predistribution and a pool of keys is already distributed to IPs at integration time and a key is negotiated at runtime. The other approach counts on Diffie-Hellman and derives the shared secret as a function of secrets of all the participating IP cores. The major limitation of these approaches is lack of scalability and efficiency. To create disrupted secure zones, [1] presented a lightweight Diffie-Hellman based key exchange protocol to derive a group session key. Some other solutions [3, 4] attempt to secure this insider communication and the main focus is to employ some group key agreement protocols. In a further enhancement, Sepulveda et al. [5] implemented three hierarchical group-wise key agreement protocols. In this paper, we present the first GKA protocol which contributes a dual keying solution for secure communication among zone participants as well outside contributors.
II. TGKA PROTOCOL
Suppose there are n participant PCs U 1 ,U 2 , ...,U n attempt to create a cluster by running a protocol (π). Each PC is equipped with a (public, private) key pair. An i th instance of the protocol is represented as Π i U where U is the corresponding user or participant. We define two identities, the session identity sid i U which is the session dependent information computed by user U at its i th instance using the shared information in that session, and the partner identity pid i U which is a set of identities of the participants who are involved in generation of the session key with Π i U . We further define the term freshness: Definition 1 (Freshness). An instance Π i U is referred to be fresh if it satisfies all the conditions mentioned in freshness definition [6] . Additionally, the instance Π i U or any of its partner has not been asked a Decryption Key Reveal query after their acceptance.
We precisely present here two round interactive authenticated twofold key agreement (TGKA) protocol divided into Setup, KeyGen, Key Agreement and Key Computation phases. The Key Computation phase consists of sub-phases to derive shared secret key as well as asymmetric key pair.
III. IDENTITY-BASED TWOFOLD GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
A TGKA protocol consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1 λ ): On input security parameter 1 λ , the PKG generates the system parameters Params in the following steps:
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• Chooses an elliptic curve group G of prime order q . Let P be a generator of group G.
• Let e : G × G → G T be an admissible bilinear map where G T is a cyclic multiplicative group of order q.
• Computes system's public key as P pub = sP by choosing a master secret s
• Finally publishes the system parameters Params = {G, q, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H, e, P pub } and keeps the master key secret. KeyGen(s): The PKG performs the following for all the group members:
• Chooses r i $ ← Z * q and computes R i = r i P.
• Computes the private key for user U i as x i = r i + sH 1 (ID i , R i ).
• The user U i can verify the private key as x i P = R i + H 1 (ID i , R i )P pub . Key Agreement(x i , pid): This protocol runs in the following two rounds: Round 1: Each user U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) does the following:
• Chooses a random string k i ∈ {0, 1} λ of length λ . Each user, except U n computes H(k i ). The user U n masks the randomness ask n = H(k n , x n ) where x n is long-term secret of U n . Now, he computes H(k n ).
• broadcasts the tuple
On receiving the message < L j , H(k j ), H(k n ), R j >, each user U i performs the following:
• Each Participant computes M i = e(l i x i P pub , P) and δ i, j = l i x i P pub + l i R j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
• Choose another random number t i ∈ Z * q and compute
Key Computation: The key computation derives two different keys as mentioned above. Shared Secret Key. Upon receiving < K ji , mask, δ j,i , σ j , T j , M j >, each user verifies the received signatures as:
Each user U i checks correctness of k i as H(k j ) = H(k j ) for (1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i) and computes session identity sid = H(k 1 ) H(k 2 ) ... H(k n ). Finally the shared session key is computed as sk = H(k 1 k 2 ... k n sid pid).
Asymmetric Key Pair. The common group encryption key (accessible to anyone) can be computed as: (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) as:
For the verification of all the received messages in one step, batch verification can be used [7] .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS Theorem 1. The two-round key agreement protocol is a AKE-secure TGKA authentication protocol with insider KCIR adversary assuming the hardness of CDH problem, unforgeability of the underlying signature and IND-ID-CCA security of the underlying encryption scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel twofold GKA protocol to be suitable for secure communication on MPSoC platform. We have considered real time issues such as the leakage of long-term secret key or faulty random number generation to leak ephemeral secrets. We hope the proposed GKA protocol will provide a basis and ready reference for future work and motivate researchers to achieve a protocol in one round, which is still a problem of interest in this domain.
